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In  most  developing  countries  relatively  little  mortgage  credit
is voluntarily  supplied. The  main reason  is the  high cost  of  enforcing
contracts, a  form of  transaction  cost  of  the  sort discussed by
Williamson  (1985). In most countries,  it is the  cost  of post-contract
governance  rather than the ex ante cost of producing  contracts  that
explains  the restrained  supply  of mortgage  credit. This  is an important
distinction because etz  ante  costs  are  dictated by  technological
conditions  i.e.,  the  nature  of the  production  function,  and  consequently
little  can be done to change  them.  The costs of governance,  on the
other  hand,  are  more  amenable  to  change. Hence  if there  are  significant
gains from  reducing  these  costs,  institutional  reforms  may help  realize
them.
The second  topic  of this  paper  is a discussion  of the  whether
there  are significant  gains for the economy  and the  housing  sector  of
reducing these transaction  costs.  The central conclusions  of this
discussion  are three:  (i) in the lowest-income  countries,  the  ex ante
transaction  costs  of providing  housing  finance  are  probably  sufficiently
high  per  dollar  of loan  that  low  levels  of  demand  explain  the  relatively
small size of this sector; however, (ii) in most other developing
countries, housing  finance systems would  be  able  to  grow  more
spontaneously  and  rapidly  if there  were  more effective  es-post  contract
enforcement procedures; and  (iii)  this growth would  improve the
efficiency  oE  financial systems and  reduce the distortions  in the
economy.  Hence  the economic  benefits  of reducing  transaction  costs  in
this  sector  are  likely  to be significant.-2-
The plan of the paper is as  follows.  Section II briefly
discusses  the role of housing  and housing  finance  in the economy. It
shows that in most developing  countries relatively  little mortgage
credit is  supplied by  formal financial intermediaries.  It  also
illustrates  why the transaction  cost approach  suggests  a much stronger
rationale  for improving  housing  finance  systems  in developing  countries
than does what might  be termed  the traditional  economic  perspective  on
financial  policy.
Sections  III and IV each consider  particular  qualities  of
housing investments  that Section II suggests  have a  bearing  on the
demand  for  and supply  of housing  finance.  The qualities  are  housing's
durability,  and its  potential  strength  as collateral. A fifth  section
compares  the  role  of ex post  and  ex ante  transaction  costs  in  explaining
the kinds of housing  finance  systems  that are observed  *n developing
countries  such  as India.
II. HOUSING,  HOUSING  FINNCE,  MUD  THE ECONOKY
Housing  investment  typically  amounts  to 3 to 8 percent  of GDP
and 15 to 30 percent  of gross  fixed  capital  formation. It is usually
the largest  single  form of household  wealth  and accounts  for between
one-quarter and  one-half of  the  capital stock  in  developed and
developing  countries.]1 However,  the share  of housing  investment  that
is financed  by formal  financial  intermediaries  in almost  all  developing
countries  is very small,  and housing  finance  accounts  for only  a small
share  of financial  assets.
Table 1 presents  estimates  of the ratio  of net new mortgage
lending from the  formal financial sector to the  level of  housing-3-
investment  in a  number of developing  and developed economies.  It
indicates  that in developing  countries  a much  greater  share  of housing
investments  comes  from  internally  generated  funds. The  average  ratio  of
mortgage  credit  supplied  by the  formal  sector  to housing  investment  was
less  than  22 percent  in developing  countries  (if  Colombia,  with  its  very
effective  housing finance system, is excluded as being atypical of
developing  countries  the  average  falls  to 16 percent),  or less  than  one-
fifth  of the  level  the  OECD  countries.
In none of the  countries  surveyed  did  home mortgages  account
for a significant  share  of financial  assets.  They certainly  did not
account  for  more  than  20 percent  of financial  assets  as they  did  at the
beginning of  the  century in  the  countries examined by  Goldsmith
(1969).21 While  it is  difficult  to  quantify  the  availability  of formal
housing  finance  in  developing  countries  in simple  but  definitive  summary
statistics,  World Bank reviews  of housing  and financial  sector  reports
are consistent  with the  Table  i.e.,  the  formal  sector  suppl  - of housing
finance  is  almost  ubiquitously  very small.
A.  Housing  Finance  and  the  Financial  Needs  of  Other  Investors
Housing is the only investment  in which an individual  is
usually  also  the  single  largest  consymer  of the  services  produced  by the
investment.  The  good  is imperfectly  divisible  so that  the  return  on the
investment  cannot  easily  be parceled  out and sold in units  of varying
sizes  (although  it is  often  subdivided).  It is  also  lumpy,  meaning  that
the annual  expenditures  on it account  for a significant  share  of all
household expenditures.  As a  result, at least in most developing
countries,  investors  in  housing  are  essentially  investing  in  a good that
they will lease to themselves  for a long time.3/  Finally,  the most- 4  -
obvious  service  provided  by  housing  is  consumption,  the  flow  of imputed
rental  income.
Encouraging  the  development  of a financial  services  industry
to provide  finance  to what after construction  will be a capital-
intensive,  consumer-goods  industry  has  quite  reasonably  not  been  of  high
priority  in development  finance  policy.  Because  housing  finance
facilitates  investment  in  a  good  that  does  not  directly  produce  much  if
any  additional  output  for  non-beneficiaries,  it  is  not  surprising  that
housing finance  improvements  have been  largely  ignored  by  the
development  finance  literature,  or  until  recently  by  World  Bank  loans.4/
However,  the transaction  cost perspective  suggests  that
housing  finance  improvements  can  have  significant  beneficial  effects  on
the economy  without  ambitious  real output  objectives. As long as
housing  finance  innovations  can be expected  to help significantly
improve  the  arrangements  of household  income  and  consumption  streams,
they  are  desirable  even  when  there  is  complete  agnosticism  as to the
appropriate  level  of housing  production  or the  effects  that  improved
housing  finance  policy  might  have  on  it.
If  such  innovations  are  not  necessarily  intended  to  have  real
output  effects,  a  major  issue  is  why  they  can  be  expect-  A to  be  able  to
improve  households'  ability  to arrange  their  income  and consumption
streams.  The  answer,  as shown  below,  is  that  in  the  appropriate  legal
environment,  housing  can  be  one  of the  best  forms  of  collateral.  As  a
result,  the  cost  of  borrowing  against  housing  will  be  one  of  the  lowest
cost forms of debt available. At the margin,  all nor--corporate
borrowers,  not juat  households,  will  want to rely  on this  form of
finance  for their  major expenditures.  Farmers  would  rather  use amortgage  to finance  inputs  than  they  would  a loan  collateralized  by
chattel. Similarly,  small  enterprise.  would  prefer  to borrow  against
the value  of the owner's  property  than against  the probability  of
success  of  a  new  enterprize.
The  argument  for  greater  access  to  market-rate  housing  finance
is  really  a broader  argument  that  implies  that  greater  recognition  be
piven  to the costs  of relying  on the directed  credit  systems  that
racterize  the  financial  systems  of  almost  all  developing  countries.
A  major  consideration  then,  and  one  that  housing  finance  innovations  can
help  address,  is  the  cost  of  mispricing  credit  risks.  Targeting  credit
on particular  outputs  as has been done (e.g.,  agriculture,  social
housing,  or  even  just  new  housing)  and  away  from  other,  "unproductive"
investments,  eliminates  the financial  system's  ability  to price  and
allocate  risks. It  causes  many  borrowers  to  have  to  rely  on  much  more
costly  substitutes  and  as  a consequence  affects  many  of the  most  basic
costs  that  confront  non-corporate  borrowers.  As  is  discussed  below,  the
proximate  result  of such  collateral  substitution  can  be  a prohibitively
large  increase  in  the  cost  of  borrowing.  The  ultimate  result  is  that
housing  finance  policy  can  be one of the  most  basic  pricing  policies
that  governments  undertake.
Ironicall-  financial regulations  designed to  protect
borrowers  from  unscrupulous  lenders  foreclosing  on their  properties
often  prevent  housing  from  being  used  as collateral.  These  kinds  of
protections  arise because,  as Goldsmith  (1987)  says of premodern
finance,  "...in  the case of trade  credit,  debtor  and creditor  are
businessmen  and  the  relationship  is  a  voluntary  and  basically  equal  one,
while  consumer  credit  is  often  the  result  of  necessity  and  the  power  of- 6  -
the  debtor,  usually  a peasant  or small  artisan  is  much weaker  than  that
of the  lender..."  Unfortunately,  the  consequences  of such  protection,  as
discussed in  Section IV,  are  more risky investments  by  financial
intermediaries,  higher  costs of borrowing  for most families,  and very
likely  less  housing.
B.  Transaction  Costs  and  Housing  Finance
Two characteristics  of housing investment  make its debt an
especially safe form of  lending:  its durability, and  its real-
denominated  return.  When properly  constructed,  housing is the most
durable  of fixed  capital  in the economy,  and its value is one of the
most impervious  to use. 5/  And, because  people  need housing  throughout
their lifetime,  and a house is often given as part of the bequests
families  leave to their heirs, housing  accounts  for a large part of
household  wealth.  Of course,  the  use of materials  with a short-life-
time,  as is often done in developing  countries,  can reduce  housing's
durability.
Housing's  durability  also affects  the demand for financing.
When the long asset  life  of the investment  is combined  with the lumpy,
largely  non-pecuniary  services  it provides,  the result  is that housing
production  often  needs financing  in order to be undertaken. For such
financing  to be  most  effective  it should  have  a maturity  that  is similar
to the  asset  life  or the  expected  length  of the  resident's  working  life,
that  is,  also  be long-term. This  kind of long-term  contract  requirea  a
set of rules for determining  how the contractual  obligations  might be
adjusted  or modified if the circumstances  of the borrower  or lender
change  during  the  course  of the  contract.-7-
Because  housing  is  a  form  of  wealth  that  is  highly
redeployable these  rules  can,  from  the  lender's 'erspective, be
relatively  straightforward. If the loan is not repaid  the house can
easily  be transferred  to  another  family  without  loss  of value  due  to the
transfer.  Moreover,  even if the borrower  loses  his or her source  of
income,  default  on repayment  is not'automatically  the best strategy  to
pursue,  at least  as long  as the  value  of the  house  exceeds  that  of the
outstanding  mortgage.  Even if the outstanding  debt does ezceed  the
value  of the property,  households  often  do not default  because  of the
indirect  costs to them of doing so--the loss in the value of their
reputation,  etc.  Consequently,  the  default  risk of  mortgage  repayments
should  be low,  and the  risk-adjusted  borrowing  rate should  reflect  this
lower  level  of risk.'
Unfortunately, from  the  borrower's perspective, contract
resolution  in the  event  of a change  in the  ability  to  repay  is anything
but straightforward. Eviction  is a difficult  procedure  to implement
even when it  is  seen  as a fair  and  reasonable  reaction  to the  behavior
of a borrower. When the  eviction  is  of a poor family  that  has had  bad
luck, it can easily become a  political  event in which the cost
forbearance  by a public  lender  is overlooked.  As a result,  it is often
difficult  to supply  the  kinds  of credible  contracts  that  would protect
lenders from  risks that  they will  be  exploited if  circumstances
permit. In such  environments,  housing  finance's  inherent  safety  due to
housing's  redeployability  is more than offset  by the lender's  having
little  recourse  to  remedies.
A  second characteristic  that affects housing's collateral
strength is  its  relatively stable real-denominated  return.  Inurbanizing  economies  with  limited  savings  options,  housing  is one  of the
principal  savings  vehicles. Because  its  return  is in real  (rather  than
in  nominal) terms  it  is  less affected by  changes in  financial
regulations, such  as  interest  rate  ceilings,  than  are  other
investments. It also does  not appear  to be as adversely  affected  by
unanticipated  increases  in the  inflation  rate as is the return  to many
other investments.11  Finally, both theory and  empirical evidence
suggest  that  housing's  value  is likely  to increase  as economies  urbanize
regardless  of the  efficacy f  the  financial  system.81 Nevertheless,  the
price and attractiveness  of such real-denominated  assets  depends  very
fundamentally  on the  credibility  and  breadth  of the  financial  system,  as
well as on the regulations  and infrastructure  investments  that govern
urban land uses.  When financial  policies  cause financial  assets  to
yield negative  real returns,  households  opportunistically  avoid these
"taxes  on saving"  by saving  in the  form  of bricks  and  mortar. When the
financial  system  is  not  credible  and/or  the  urban  regulatory  environment
is not  flexible, the price of urban chelter can often become not
affordable.
III. HOUSING'S  DURABILITY
It is  common  to find  houses  in  use in  many  countries  that  were
built hundreds  of years ago.  Moreover,  the fact that only a  tiny
portion  of the  housing  stock  of a country  is  very  old  does  not  mean that
housing  depreciates  or wears  out at a particular  rate.  More commonly,
housing  is demolished  because  the land value  has changed  in such  a way
that it  becomes more economical and  efficient to  proride housing
services  through  a different  type of structure,  or to use the land to- 9  -
provide  other  kinds  of services,  such  as  office  buildings.  Hence,  while
it may be difficult  to determine  how long  a house can be expected  to
'ast, it  is  likely to be one of  the longest-lived  goods in the
economy.  Housing's durability has  very  basic  effects on  the
affordability  of  both  housing  and  the  debt that  is  needed  to finance  it.
A.  The  Mortgage  Repayment  Tilt  Problem
Mortgage  debt affordability  is an insidious  problem  because
unlike  most other  sectors  of the  economy,  changes  in the  inflation  rate
can make it less affordable.  As a  result  housing can become less
affordable  without  any  change  in real  income  or real prices. Inflation
can have such  "real-side"  effects  on the  efficacy  of mortgage  contracts
because  of the nature  of long-term  mortgage  debt contracts  written  in
nominal  terms. Even  relatively  low  rates  of inflation  redistribute  real
mortgage  repayments  towards  the  early  years  of a mortgage  loan,  making
payments  out of income  in those  years more difficult.9! As is well
kvown,  this  change  in  borrowing  costs  is  a redistribution  of real  costs,
not an increase  in costs.  Unfortunately,  it is a redistribution  in a
direction  that  is  opposite  to the  one  preferred  by families  whose  income
can  keep  pace  with inflation  over  the  longer  term.
Figure 1  looks at the implications  of this "tilting,"  or
"front-loading,"  of real mortgage  repayments  from an aggregate  rather
than individual  perepective. It examines  how increases  in the  rate of
inflation  can  affect  the  number  of households  able  to pay  25 percent  of
family income to afford the  same-priced  house with the same-sized
downpayment.
The income  distribution  figures  are for urban  family  income
for  Turkey  for 1985.1°/ Point  A represents  the  income  level  needed  to- 10  -
qualify  for  a house  that  costs  2.5  times  the  median  urban  family  income,
if the household  were able to make a 30 percent  downpayment  and could
finance  a 20-year  fixed-interest  rate loan.  The interest  rate  on the
loan  reflects  a 6 percent  real  interest  rate,  and  the  slightly  less  than
9 percent inflation  rate that characterized  the 1950-74  period.  The
income  needed  to qualify  is slightly  more than  the  median  income  level,
the  60th percentile,  because lenders are  assumed to  require that
households  spend  no more than 25 percent  of their income  on mortgage
payments.I_/  Point B reflects  the income  level  needed to finance  a
fixed-interest  rate  loan  that  incorporates  the  higher  inflation  rates  of
more recent  years.  Instead  of a 15 percent  nominal  interest  rate,  the
interest  rate is 36 percent. If the increase  in inflation  from  9 to 30
percent  was anticipated,  in the absence  of contracts  that adjust for
this  change  in  the  distribution  of real  repayments,  it  would  have  priced
homeownership  out of the reach  of all but the  highest-income  families.
The absence  of such  contracts  imposes  a large  cost  of transacting  on a
large  number  of families.
The  Policy  Response  to  Mortgage  Affordability  Problems
Policy  makers in developing  countries  have responded  to the
mortgage affordability  problems in  two  basic ways:  through credit
subsidies  or through  redesign  of the  mortgage  contract,  usually  through
some form of indexation  of repayments. The former  approach  will be
discussed in Section IV.  Here the latter approach is considered.
Indexation  attempts  to immunize  the real value  of mortgage  repayments
from the high and uncertain rate of inflation  anticipated  at  loan
origination,  which creates the severe  cash-flow  problem  described  by
Figure  1.- 11  -
In  high-inflation  countries,  such  as  those  of Latin  America,
mort-age  indexation  was  introduced  to  ameliorate  housing  affordability
problems.  However,  these  instruments  were  not  introduced  to  facilitate
the  contracting  undertaken  by  two  parties in  an  inflationary
environment,  as has been suggested  by a number  of observers,  e.g.
Friedman  (1974).  The movement  away  from  the  use  of nominal-interest
rate,  level-payment  mortgage  schedules  (as occurred  Chile  in 1959,
Brazil  in  1964,  Colombia  in  1972,  and  Argentina  in  1976)  was  the  result
of  governments'  selective credit policies rather than  market
participants  modifying their contracting  methods.121  While indexed
contracts  were  a  cost-effective  means  of  restructuring  payments  to  lower
payments  and  redistribute  the  high  real  initial  costs,  they  were  not  an
effective  means  of introducing  the kinds  of credible  contracts  that
would  induce  investors  to be willing  to share  the risks  posed  by
indexation.  Ex  post,  in  every  case  except  Colombia,  the  approaches  that
have  been  implemented  have  experienced  serious  problems.
The main problem  has been that  loan  repayments  were  often
indexed  to wages  rather  than  to prices  and steady  real  wage  growth
stopped. When real wage reductions  occurred,  the indexes  produced
automatic  loan  forgiveness  rather  than  loan  forbearance.  Forgiveness
applied  equally  to  those  whose  wages  out-performed  the  general  index  and
those  whose  wages  did  not.  In  this  respect,  the  indexes  were  a  form  of
real  wage  insurance  rather  than  a mortgage  contract.  It  is  of  course
the case that an indexed  loan increases  lenders'  exposure  to real
economic  risks.  However,  the  use  of  indexes  that  automatically  discount
the  borrower's  liability  if  average  real  wages  do  not  increase  does  more
than  increase  the  riskiness  of  such  loans.  If  the  real  in.erest  charged-12  -
does  not compensate  for  these  additional  risks,  the  loan terms  create  a
situation  in which the contract is not credible,  and only publicly
supported  and implicitly  subsidized  lenders  participate.
As a  means  of reducing  mortgage  affordability  concerns  (rather
than housing  affordability  problems),  indexation  has much to recommend
it,  particularly  relative  to credit  subsidies. With indexed  repayments
long-term mortgages  can  be  attractive investments to  long-term
investors.  However,  it is  difficult  to  exaggerate  either  the  importance
of the credibility  of the  mortgage  design  to success  of such  efforts  or
the likelihood  that such instruments  will not perform in financial
environments  ir which inflation  remains  at extremely  high and  volatile
levels. Hence  the  costs  and  benefits  of mortgage  indexation  depend  very
basically  on the  design  of the  instrument.
Because  of housing's  durability  mortgage  design  must  take  real
as opposed  to nominal  repayments  into  account. Otherwise  the  cash-flow
problems of  mortgage contracting,  rather than rates of  return on
investment,  will  dominate decision-making  with  respect to  housing
investment.  Equally  important  in mortgage  design  is the recognition
that solving  the  mortgage  cash-flow  problem  through  indexation  exposes
the lender  to another  risk, i.e., that real wages  will permit  higher
nominal  payments  to be made.  In some  environments  this risk  is  a large
one  and  failure  to price  or reward  this  kind  of risk-taking  will  result
in  a contracting  process  that  is  not  credible.
IV. IOUSINC  'S  COLL&TEhl EFFICIENCY
Housing can be a relatively  strong  form of collateral  for
three  reasons.  First,  its  value  after  a  household's lifetime- 13  -
consumption  of housing  services  is relatively  high,  and the  behavior  of
this  value  depends  less  on the skills  of the  occupants  or, as shown  in
Table 2, the behavior  of the economy  than  do the  values  of most other
assets.  The simplicity  and relative  constancy  of its yield  makes it
less likely  that the value  of the asset  financed  will fall below the
value of the debt used to finance  the  asset.  As a consequence,  it is
less  likely  that  the  borrower  will  be  willing  to trade  the  house  for  the
mortgage,  as occurs  in  a foreclosure.
Second,  unlike  other  real  assets  that  are durable  and  subject
to little  value  degradation  with use--e.g.,  gold and diamonds,  housing
is fixed-capital.  It is not  easy to abscond  with,  which  makes  it safer
against fraudulent  practices,  and, it requires  relatively  few under-
writing  precautions  and relatively  little  diligence  in monitoring  the
behavior  of the  borrower.13/
Finally,  housing can be a strong  form of collateral  because
the services  it provides  are generally,  and in developing  countries
increasingly,  demanded. While investment  in,  e.g.,  a steel  plant  will
incur  a loss if the  venture  fails,  the  houses  occupied  by the  employees
of the failed  plant are less likely  to lose as much value as is the
plant.  The  plant  is highly  specialized  and can  only produce  steel;  the
house  can  be redeployed  to provide  housing  services  to the  employees  of
other  industries.  It  can  be sold  or rented  to  other  workers  of another,
more successful  venture. More importantly,  the steel  plant  employees'
skills  are also more flexible  than is the plant's  capital.  They can
often change jobs and continue  to be able to repay their loan.  Of
course, this is not  to say that households  will always have such
options.  Rather  it is to suggest  that  they  are likely  to have  more of
them  more  often  than  will  specialized  investors.- 14  -
Besides  being  a  less  risky  investment  than  is  investment  in  a
single-use  project,  such  as  the  steel  plant,  empirical  evidence  suggests
that housing  is also less risky than is a general  investment  in
equities. For instance,  as Cunningham  and Hendershott  (1984)  have
shown,  the  interest  rate  adjustment  needed  to compensate  for  the  risk
associated  with  default  risk  in  the  U.S.  has  been  on the  order  of 1/2
percent  per  annum  for  loans  with  loan-to-value  ratios  of 90 percent.
This is a  credit  risk  fee that is a  fraction  of the fee charged
preferential  corporate  borrowers.141
Table  2  presents  data  on  the  volatility  of  house  prices  vis-a-
vis  that  of  an investment  in  equities  in  a number  of  countries.  This
measure  is  helpful  in  assessing  housing's  collateral  strength  because
the  risk  that  loans  will  not  be  repaid  is  greatest  if  the  value  of  the
outstanding  mortgage  exceeds  the value  of the house.-5/ Housing's
relatively  low  volatility  implies  that  the  risk  of  households  repaying
mortgage  loans  should  be lower  than are the risks  associated  with
financing  more  price-volatile  assets.
The  Table  presents  the  coefficient  of  variation  of  time  series
data  on the  real  price  of housing  and the stock  market  indices  for
various  types  of economies:  developing  countries  with  high  inflation
rates  that  have  experienced  substantial  real  shocks,  a relatively  low-
inflation  developing  economy,  a  high  growth  rate  developing  country  and
developed  low  and  high  inflation  economies.  With  real  interest  rate  and
income  changes  real  house  pri':es  fell  in  all cases,  sometimes  fairly
sharply.  However,  in  no  case  was  the  drop  anything  like  the  reduction
in stock  market  values. Italy  experienced  the  highest  relative  real
house  price  volatility,  and this  was  less  than  half  the  volatility  of
the  stock  market  index.- 1S  -
Of course  since  most  homeowners  can  only  own  one  house  the
cross-sectional  variance  of the  return  to  housing  and its  covariance
with  the  returns  on other  assets  is  also  very  important  in  evaluating
housing's  collateral  efficiency.  Sufficient  lata  do not exist  with
respect  to  housing's  cross-sectional  variance.  However,  Friedman  (1985)
has  examined  housing's  covariance  properties.  He  concludes  that  in  the
U.S.  it  is  much  less  risky  than  are  investments  in  debt,  either  short  or
long-term,  or  equities.  Hence  even  if  the  return  to  housing  has  a  high
cross-sectional  variance,  a  fall in house prices  is likely  to be
contemporaneous  with  a smaller  decline  in overall  wealth  than  is the
case  for  a fall  in  the  value  of other  forms  of  wealth. As  a result,
housing  investments  will  tend  to  be safe  relative  not  only  to  specific
investments  but to investments  that  are  diversified  across  economies.
This  collateral  strength  of  housing  implies  that  availability  of  market-
rate credit  for this  asset  has implications  for both  borrowers  and
lenders.
A. Borrower  Concerns  with  Housing's  Collateral  Efficiency
Borrowers'  concerns  with  housing's  collateral  efficiency  arise
because  of  the  long-run  fungibility  of  credit.  That  is,  over  the  long-
run,  households  attempt  to  finance  their  investments  with  the  lowest-
cost  credit. As has been  stressed,  if housing  provides  the safest
collateral,  all  other  things  being  constant,  it  should  also  be  one  of
the  least  costly  ways  to  borrow.  This  view  was  first  made  with  respect
to mortgage  credit  by Meltzer  (1974). He showed  that  over  the  20th
century  the  share  of mortgage  credit  in household  liabilities  in the
U.S.  grew  much  more  rapidly  than  did  the  share  of  housing  in  household
wealth.- 16  -
The  data  in  Figure  2,  for  a longer  time  period,  corroborate
his  basic  point: the  rate  of increase  in  the  housing/wealth  ratio  was
not as rapid  as the increase  in  mortgage  indebtedness.  The implied
loan-to-value  ratio  increased  from  approximately  .3 in 1805  to .6 in
1978. While  neither  ratio  can  be considered  as excessive,  the  trend
suggests  U.S. households  have been  using  the relatively  inexpensive
mortgage  credit  to  finance  expenditures  other  than  housing.
For  borrowers  in  developing  countries,  restrictions  on  being
able  to  rely  upon  the  collateral  efficiency  of  housing  is  likely  to  be
more  important  than  in  developed  countries  because  there  are  fewer  other
ways  to collaterize  the  human  capital  that  will  produce  higher  future
earnings. As a result,  the cost  implied  by restricting  access  to
market-rate  mortgage  credit  is  higher  in  these  countries  than  it  is  in
countries  where  borrowers  have  greater  access  to  alternatives.  If  one
takes  a life-cycle  view  of  consumer  behavior,  it is  clear  that  it is
younger  households  who  bear  most  of  the  incidence  of  this  restriction.
B. Lender  Concerns  with  Housing's  Collateral  Efficiency
Developing  country  lender  concerns  with  housing's  collateral
efficiency  arise  for  two  reasons. First,  the  technical  insolvency  of
such a  large portion  of  developing  country  Development  Finance
Institutions  indicates  that  ex  post  these  lenders  bave  underpriced  risks
they  have  assumed.16/  An important  part  of  any  restructuring  strategy
for these institutions  should  be encouragement  of safer lending.
Housing's  collateral  efficiency  suggests  that  correctly  priced  mortgage
finance  can  be  part  of  this  "flight  to safety."  This  is  particularly
true  of finaLncial  systems  that  are  deregulating  and  removing  portfolio
restrictions.  Less  constrained  lenders  are  by  definition  able  to  take- 17  -
more  risks,  and investing  in  market-rate  mortgages  can  be part  of a
risk-tempering  deregulation  strategy.17/
Second,  financiers  of few  other  assets  can  reasonably  assume
that  demand  for  assets  they  are  financing  will  be  income-elastic  over  a
wide  range  of  development.-S/  Mortgage  intermediation  can  be  expected
to  yield  not  only  a safe  positive  return  to  savers,  but  also  a  growing
source  of safe  income  with  which  to  mobilize  the  financial  savings  of
the  household  sector.  By  providing  market-rate  mortgage  credit  as  well
as  deposit-taking  services  intermediaries  may  be  able to  more
effectively  mobilize  resources  from  households.
C. The  Policy  Response  to  Housing's  Collateral  Efficiency
In few  developing  countries  are  lenders  able  to  exploit  the
inherent  collateral  safety  of  housing  loans. When  land  tenure  rights
are ambiguous,  or foreclosure  proceedings  uncertain  or interminable,
what  in principle  is  a low-risk  loan  in  practice  becomes  a high-risk
one. For  example,  an  Indian  government  study  showed  that  it  could  take
"not  less  than  ten  years"  to foreclose  on  a mortgage  borrower  who  had
not  made  payments.19/
Such  a basis  of  proceeding  has  to  be  both  inefficient  and  an
encouragement  to  act  in  financially  disreputable  ways. Similarly,  while
public  investment  in  land  titling  and  recordation  systems  may  appear  to
be  a significant  expenditure,  lack  of such  titles  forces  borrowers  to
rely  on their  next  most  effective  form  of collateral  which  for  many
borrowers  are either  non existent  or much  more  expensive  (e.g.,  pawn
shops). Recently  an Indian  company,  The  Housing  Development  Finance
Company  of  Bombay  (HDFC),  has  used  an  effective  way  to  circumvent  these
kinds  of contract  enforcement  problems. In the next section  their- 18 -
approach  will be contrasted  with what  might  be termed  as ex ante
transaction  cost  explanation  for  the  limited  supply  of  housing  finance
in  India.
V.  TRANSACTION  COSTS  AND  HOUSING  FINANCE  IN INDIA
According  to  Morris  (1985)  as  of 1980  formal  housing  finance
in India  was virtually  non existent  even  though  the  financial  system
was  highly  developed.  The  explanations  that  have  been  offered  for  this
state  of affairs  correspond  to  what  might  be termed  a traditional
economic  explanation  for the relatively  weak development  of housing
finance  systems  in  most  developing  countries.  That  is,  the  systems  are
not  observed  because  at  existing  prices  they  have  not  been  wanted.  The
ex  ante  administrative  costs  of the  loans  are  too  high,  the  affordable
loan  sizes  too low to interest  investors,  or formal  lenders  cannot
compete  with  the  lc4n  terms  made  available  through  the  inter-family  or
informal  loan  market. lhe result,  then,  is little  or no supply  of
formal  housing  finance  because  at  the  market  price  there  is  little  or  no
demand.  According  to this  view, the technological  constraints  are
prohibitive.  Consider  the  premises  of  this  line  of  argument.
A. Reconsidering  the  High  Ex  Ante  Cost  Explanation
The  high  ex  ante  cost  explanation  has  two  premises:  (i)  When
administrative  costs  per mortgage  loan  are  combined  with  small  loan
sizes,  the  effective  borrowing  costs  are  sufficiently  high  that  demand
for credit  is discouraged;  and (ii) Even if the first point is
inaccurate,  the  proportion  of income  households  are  willing  and  able  to
pay  to  service  mortgage  debt  payments  is  such  that  the  aggregate  demand
for  this  credit  is  not  likely  to  be  a  major  credit  market  activity.  For
India  both  of  these  premises  are  dubious.- 19  -
The high administrative  cost  argument  is  o. course  correct  in
an absolute  sense.  There  are some relatively  fixed  costs,  call these
costs  F, associated  with all lending,  and amortizing  these  costs  over
smaller  loan sizes necessarily  results in higher effective interest
rates,  F+R,  where  R is the  risk  free  cost  of funds. These  higher  rates,
in turn, will reduce the demand for mortgage  credit.  However,  the
amount  by which these higher  administrative  costs increase  the total
cost  of borrowing--where  the  total  cost  of borrowing  C=F+R+D,  and  D is  a
risk  premium  for  the loan's  being  repaid--is  almost  certainly  less  than
the mount that  housing's  collateral  safety  reduces  the  risk  premium,  D,
that  lenders  require.  For example,  mortgage  loans  made by the  HDFC of
India  earn a spread  of less than  3 percent  over the  cost  of funds  that
have  a maturity  similar  to that  of its  mortgages. This figure  is less
than  half the  increase  in borrowing  costs  on unsecured  loans  relative  to
secured  loans  in  India. Hence  even  if the  fixed  administrative  costs  on
mortgages  are absolutely  high, the expected default costs are much
lower. When  all  the  costs  are  taken  together  housing  should  still  be  an
inexpensive  way to  borrow.201 The  appropriate  benchmark  for  considering
whether these kinds of  costs are  likely to  limit the growth of
intermediation  in  the  sector  is  their  size  relative  to the  difference  in
total  costs  between  borrowing  on secured  and  unsecured  loans.
The second  ex ante line  of argument  as to why  there  is little
or no demand for housing  financial  services  in developing  countries--
that household repayment capacity limits demand--is  flawed for two
reasons. First,  it focuses  only  on flows  of income,  and  minimum  housing
costs rather than on  possible  adjustments  of household portfolios.
Second, it understates  demand by relying  on expenditures  on housing- 20  -
consumption  as  a  measure  of how  much people  would  be willing  to pay  for
homes.
An  example of the first type of argument  is made by Mohan
(1987). He estimates  that if  households  in India  were  willing  to spend
some  reasonable  portion  of their  income  on mortgage  repayments,  even  20
to 30 percent,  and the credit  markets  would  accommodate  these  demands,
the aggregate  share  of credit  market  activity  in mortgage  credit  would
not reach  significant  levels  over the near term  because  few  households
could  afford  the  minimum  housing  unit.
This  line  of  argument overlooks the  fact  that  in  1978
household  holdings  of gold  and  precious  metals  in  India  were  equal  to 70
percent  of real  estate  holdings. By comparison,  in the  beginning  of the
19th century households in four of  today's developed  economies  had
precious  metal holdings  equal to less than 18 percent  of their real
estate  holdings.211 Moreover,  this latter  ratio  declined  for the next
100 years  to less than 3 percent  as financial  systems  developed. With
increased  access  to market  rate  credit  one  would  expect  Indian  families
to be willing  to shift some of their current  real-denominated  wealth
holdings  into  similarly  real-denominated  housing  investments.
These kinds of  potentially  enormous portfolio shifts are
overlooked  by mortgage  demand estimates  that focus  only on household
income levels compared to  house costs.22/  A  similar problem of
understating  the  likely  demand  for  housing  finance  arises  when analysts
use estimates  of how much households  are willing  to pay out  of current
income  to consume  housing services  as renters  to predict  how much of
current  income  they  would be willing  tv allocate  to mortgage  payments.
This approach  necessarily  overlooks  the savings  motivation  for  housing- 21 -
demand.  It  will, as  a  result, overlook a  source of demand that
contributes  to the  observed  high  levels  of house  price-to-income  ratios
observed  in  many  developing  countries. The  next section  discusses  a way
in which the savingo  motivation  for  housing  demand  has been exploited.
The  method  relies on  informal norms  rather  than  legal  contract
enforcement  remedies  to  assure  that  loans  are  repaid.
B.  Bridging  Informal  Norms  and  Formal  Financial  Sector  Requirements
As stressed  earlier,  a contentious  issue in many developing
countries  is the development  of a fair and efficient  way to resolve
mortgage  repayment  disputes  between  lower-  and  moderate-income  borrowers
and  large  financial  institutions.  The importance  of this  kind  of issue
understandably  increases  in countries  such  as India,  where  lenders  have
traditionally  been  large  landowners  who  lent  at high  real  interest  rates
to borrowers  who  were  often  landless  peasants  living  at near  subsistence
levels.23/
The  Indian nationalization  of  the banking system and the
massive  and  highly  subsidized  extension  of commercial  bank  branches  were
part  of  a policy  response  to this  kind  of economic  environment,  with  the
state  replacing  the  wealthy  as lenders. Unfortunately,  the  policy  also
encouraged: ti)  a banking  culture  that  has tolerated  excessive  default
and  delinquency  rates  - the  latter  are in  excess  of 50 percent  for  many
agricultural  lenders;24/  and (ii)  according  to the aforementioned  Shah
Report (1978), a  legal system that can require exceedingly  lengthy
foreclosure  proceedings.
The Indian  approach  to financial  development  lent itself  to
behavior  in  which  people  cannot  be counted  on to do what  they  said  they
would  that  is,  to repay  loans  as they  promised  when they  borrowed. Such- 22  -
a hazardous  formal  financial  environment  is hardly  hospitable  to the
development  of market-oriented  housing  finance  for  moderate-  and lower-
income households.  Nor is it conducive to the development  of the
financial  system,  because  the low return  on lending  has consistently
produced  negative  returns  on  most financial  assets.25/
The Housing  Development  Finance  Company  of India (HDFC)  has
now operated for 10 years in this kind of environment,  establishing
branches  all over  India,  and  making  more than  200,000  mortgage  loans  at
market  interest  rates. Remarkably,  although  the  loans  have  been  made  to
lower-  and moderate-income  households,  and  have an average  size  of less
than US$4,000, they have produced  a delinquency  rate of less than 1
percent.  This  is a  rate that  compares very  favorably with  the
experience  of lenders  in more developed  economies.  For instance,  the
U.S. Federal  Housing  Authority,  (FHA)  experiences  a 7 percent  default
rate and a much higher  delinquency  rate on the unsubsidized  loans it
insures.
HDFC has accomplished  this record  by  circumventing  but not
avoiding  the formal  mechanisms  for  dealing  with loan  disputes. Because
legal regulations  eliminated  the threat  that a borrower  could  quickly
lose  his property  in the  event  of a default,  HDFC focused  on incentives
and moral  suasion outside of  the  legal system--in  particular,  on
borrowers'  concerns  with  their  reputations. Third-party  guarantees  are
sought  on almost  all loans.  The "third  party"  is always  someone  the
borrower  respects  - an older  colleague  or a relative,  for  example. Like
the  borrower,  the  guarantor  also  has to submit  a financial  statement  to
demonstrate  an ability  to repay  the  loan in the  event  that:the  borrower
cannot  or will  not  do so.  If  loans  are  not  repaid  promptly  the  borrower- 23 -
is immudiately  notified. If  his response  is  unsatisfactory,  the  threat
of calling on the guarantor  for repayment  is raised,  and ultimately
followed through on  in  the  face of  further recalcitrance  on  the
borrower's  part.
If such  follow-up  still  produces  no response,  legal  action  is
initiated. Ultimately,  neither  the  borrower  nor the  guarantor's  rights
are subverted  by HDFC's  appeal  to informal  values  as way of inducing
contract  fulfillment. However,  neither  has HFDC relied  on the formal
legal  code to provide  the  basis  for  effective  contract  governance.  The
value that the borrower  is protecting  by repaying  is not the value  of
the  house;  it is  the  value  of his  reputation.
HDFC's  success  is  a result  of bridging  informal  cultural  norms
as  to  the reasonableness  of  fulfilling contracts with  the formal
financial  sector needs.  Its excellent  record of loan recovery  and
payout to depositors  provides  the credibility  essential  to convince
formal sector financial investors (such as  corporations  and  other
financial  intermediaries)  that deposits in the corporation  are safe.
Its  underwriting  practices  represent  a creative  way of avoiding  the  high
costs  of  enforcing contracts in  the  Indian legal  system.  By
establishing  a new "custom"  of appropriate  behavior  it has made such
activities  attractive  investments.
VI. CONCLUSION
The role of better  contract  enforcement  as a limiting  factor
on the  growth of  housing finance systems has  been stressed  here,
nevertheless,  it is also clear  that in some  developing  countries  there
is relatively  little  demand for housing finance.  For instance,  if a- 24  -
household  wanted to spend only, say 5 percent of income,  on housing
services,  as  might be the case in countries  with very low per-capita
incomes,61 if land titles  were also unclear,  and the administrative
costs  of intermediation  exceeded  5  percent,  formal  housing  finance  would
probably  not be in great demand.  in this  kind of environment,  mutual
organizations  can be expected to be very effective,  offering their
members  a way to share  and thereby  reduce  the  administrative  costs  of
intermediation.  Even more importantly,  they  can help develop  credible
contracts  requiiring  that  loans  be repaid  as  long  as the  borrower  is able
to  do so.
On the other hand, in countries  where the basic urban and
financial  infrastructure  already  exists  and  in  which  there  is an  attempt
to  accelerate  the  development  of the  financial  systems--that  is,  in  most
developing  cmountries--hovsing  finance  reforms  can  play  an important  role
in reducing transaction  costs.27/  Mechanisms  that allow long-term
contracts  to protect  the  interests  of  both  savers  and  borrowers--such  as
fair but efficient  foreclosure  procedures,  and the  appropriate  type  of
mortgage  instrument--can  do much more than  just  contribute  to a better-
functioning  housing  market.- 25  -
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TABLE  l:  INCREASE  IN  HOUSING  CREDIT (RC)  AS A SAEa  OF
HOUSING  INVESTMENT  (HI),  SELECTED  COUNTtIES
Country  HC/HI  Country  HC/HI
Mexico  .20  Kenya  .11
India  -10  Tunisia  .11
Turkey  .08  Korea  .20
Malaysia  .50  Pakistan  .11
Morocco  .15  Philippines  .26
Colombia  .75  Portugal  20
United  Kingdom.58  Senegal  .06
Thailand  .33
United  States  1.26
Canada  .76
ORCD  Average  excluding U.S.  and  Turkey  .85
Sources: Various  World  Bank  Sector  Reports  and  parti-
cularly  Renaud  (1984); For  the  U.S.
Anthony  Downs;  for  the  U.K.,  Building  Society  Gazette;  OECD
average  is inferred  from  Vittas  et.  &I. (1987). The
Colombian  figure  is  derived  from  Isaza  (1987)  with the
assumption  that  land  value  is  equal  to 2S percent  of house
value. The figures  are  from  the  late  19709.-28-
TABLE  2: COEFPICIMITS  O  VAMIATION  OP HOUSE
PRICES AND  STOCK  MARKET  INDEXES
Country  House  Prices  Stock  Index  Ratio  col.2/col.l
Argentina  .090  .399  4.3
Brazil  .060  .325  5.4
Italy  .114  .294  2.6
Korea  .081  .471  5.8
Malaysia  .027  .120  4.4
United  Kingdom  .075  .20  2.7
United  States  .063  .141  2.2
Average  .073  .279  3.8
Sources: Estatisticas  Historicas  Do Brasil,  1987;  Business  and
Investment  Almanac;  S&P's  Trade  and  Securities  Statistics;  Inflation
and  Capital  Markets  - proceedings  of the  OECD-CMB  conference,  1986.
The  U.K.,  lolmans  (1987),  Italy,  Mazzola  (1988),  Korea,  Renaud. The
tim  periods  for  the  various  countries  are: Argentina  and  Braxil  1977-
85,  Malaysia  1981-85,  U.S.A.  1975-86,  Korea  1980-87;  Italy  1975-85,  and
U.K. 1975-85.- 29  -
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FOOTNOTES
1/  See  Goldsmith  (1985)  for  the  most  complete  discussion  of this  kind
of data.  Ibbotson  and Siegel  (1983)  estimate  that real estate
accounts  for approximately  one-third  of the world  market  wealth
portfolio.  Housing accounts for a  larger proportion  of  the
capital stock than of  fixed capital formation  because of its
longer life.  In the U.S., for example,  the service life of
residential  capital  used to derive  wealth  estimates  is more than
double  that  of  any  non-residential  investment.
2/  In  11 of  the countries examined by Goldsmith (1969), it  is
possible  to identify  (approximately)  the share of mortgages in
financial assets.  The  countries and  their average share of
financial  assets  in mortgages  are:  Argentina,  1901,  .27;  Denmark,
1900, .39; Egypt, 1900, .58; Germany,  1900, .28; Greece,  1929,
.07;  Italy,  1908,  .12;  netherlands,  1900, .10;  Spain,  1913,  .04?
Switzerland,  1900, .18; U.S., 1900, .18;  Yugoslavia,  1929, .08;
average,  .21,  median,  .18.
The  beginning  of the  20th  century  was  used  rather  than  more  recent
data because 6  of  the  11  countries in  the  survey are  now
industrialized,  and their  current  financial  asset  holdings  should
reflect  this  pattern  of real  asset  demand  rather  than  the  pattern
that might  be  associated  with an  industrializing,  urbanizing
economy.
3/  To examine  the  housing  tenure  patterns.of  developing  countries  a
regression  equation  was estimated  for  42 countries. The percent
of housing  units that were owner-occupied  was regressed  on per-
capita  income  and the  level  of urbanization.  The  hypothesis  that
homeownership  is  a primitive  form  of tenure  and inversely  related
to both the  level  of income  and urbanization  was supported. Both
variables  were  statistically  significant  "explanators."  Hence  the
conclusion  in the text  on the  higher  likelihood  of homeownership
and more individually  based  housing  finance  demand  in developing
countries. The  data  on tenure  are  from  Boleat  (1985).
4/  See Buckley  et al (1988)  for  a review  and  analysis  of World  Bank
lending  for housing finance.  See Currie  (1966)  for one of he
exceptions  to this lack of attention to the role of housing
finance  in  economic  development.
S/  For example, U.S.  studies estimate that the  service life of
residential  investments  in 1 to 4 unit structures  is 80 years.
Industrial  buildings  have a service  life of 31 years.  See U.S.
Department  of Commerce  (1987). Pg.  xxii.- 33  -
6/  Cunningham  and  Hendershott (1984) provide a  good example of
analyses  that  focus  on the  optimal  default  strategy. They suggest
that in the U.S. the indirect  transactions  costs of defaulting
should  be on the order  of 20 percent  of the  loan  amount. Foster
and Van  Order  (1985)  provide  empirical  support  for the  conclusion
that households  face high transactions  costs which reduce the
speed  at which households  exercise  their  "put" options,  and by
defaulting  essentially  sell  the  house  to the  lender  or insurer  in
exchange  for  the  mortgage.
7/  See  Gultekin's  (1983)  analysis  of stock  market  returns  in various
countries  and the  effect  of inflation  on these  returns.
8/  In countries  that are already  highly  urbanized,  such as the U.S.
or Latin  America,  in some areas  of the country  housing  can be a
risky  investment.
9/  See  Lessard  and  Modigliani  (1975).
10/  Housing  Sector  Report,  Turkey,  USAID-World  Bank  (1989).
11/  These calculations  ignore  the effects  of the  higher  house  price-
to-income  ratio  that obtains  in Turkey.  This approach  was taken
to  focus on  the  direct  effects of  inflation on  mortgages
affordability.
12/  See Fishlow  (1978)  for a discussion  of the policy  objectives  of
indexation  in Brazil.
13/  Goldsmith's  (1987)  work on Premodern  Financial  Systems  indicates
that the  cost differential  for mortgage  debt was substantial.
Wai's  (1977) analysis yields similar results for  developing
countries.
14/  For  example,  Fons (1987)  shows  that  U.S. investors  who received  a
yield  differential  of 3.5 percent  for  holding  corporate  debt that
was  not  of  AAA  quality were compensated  for  losses due  to
default.  Kau and Sirmans  (1984)  also found  urban land to be a
less  risky  asset  than  high  gradp  corporate  bonds.
15  See  footnote  6 on optimal  default  strategies.
16/  See the  World Bank Paper  on Financial  Intermediation  (1985). It
indicates  that one-third  of the development  finance  institutions
that  received  World  Bank  loans  were  technically  insolvent.- 34 -
17/  See the 1988  regulatory  requirements  recommended  by the  Bank for
International  Settlements. They identify  mortgages  as being  much
less risky financial  assets.  Ironically,  the most significant
mispricing  of risks  that  occurred  in the  U.S. financial  system  in
recent  years was that of its main mortgage  lenders,  the savings
and  loan associations.  However, the mispricing was  due  to
structure  of deposit  insurance  and not the type of lending  under
taken.
18/  See  Burns  and  Grebler  (1975).
19/  The  Shah  Report  (1978)  to  the  Reserve  Bank  of Iidia.
20/  Williamson  (1983)  provides  a proof  of why better  terms  should  be
offered  to a transactor  who offers  a "hostage"  that insures  his
fulfillment  of the contract.  Timberg  and Aijar (1984)  present
credit  market  rates  information  for  India.
21/  Goldsmith  (1985). The countries  are the  U.K.,  U.S.,  Germany,  and
France.
22/  This is not to suggest that reducing  minimum  housing costs by
changing  Indian  building  standards  is  unimportant.
23/  See  Akerlof's  (1970)  discussion  and  the  sources  there.
24/  Morris  (1985).
25/  Charavarty  Report,  Reserve  Bank  of India  (1985).
26/  See Malpezzi and Mayo (1985) for estimates  of income  housing
expenditure  levels  by income  level.
27/  See Renaud (1989)  for a fuller  discussion  of the preconditions
necessary  to  establish  a  housing  finance  system.PPR  Working  PMper  Seoas
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